Foreign and Native Soils: Migrants and the Uses of Landscapes
Forthcoming in Cultural Heritage, Ethics and Contemporary Migrations (Routledge), edited by Geoffrey Scarre, Cornelius Holtorf and Andreas Pantazatos.

Since land is older than the borders which humans have drawn and redrawn upon its surface, it may seem that, unlike the artefacts which people make with materials taken from the landscapes around them, land itself is endlessly open for new waves of migrants to embrace as part of their own heritage. Yet humans do mark landscapes, sometimes in lasting ways: not only roads and buildings but agriculture, forestry, dams and diverted rivers, quarrying and mining and more. It is landscape archaeologists who are most able to trace the material evidence of how landscapes were used and by whom; and so when interests in land are contested, archaeological evidence may be cited in order to distinguish the long-established community from the geographical Johnny-come-lately, or to cast doubt on whether this can meaningfully be done. (An example is litigation concerning forests in southern Belize, once logging had made them profitable: the ethnographic and archaeological question of whether peoples inhabiting the area were descended from the ancient Maya, or whether from more recent immigrants, became a point of legal disputation.) This chapter assesses the ethical use of scientific knowledge when settlement, and the traces of settlement which archaeology can uncover, can leave newer immigrants finding that the very ground beneath their feet already looks like someone else’s cultural artefact.


In Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy: Technology (Cengage, 2017), edited by Tony Beavers.

[Erratum note: on p.200, for ‘is no stranger’ read ‘are no stranger’.]

A commissioned textbook chapter.


(published as How Might Brexit Affect Attempts by the E.U. to Define “European Culture”?)
Brexit Central, 11th February 2017

‘European culture’ is symbolically important to the European project: how the E.U. pursues cultural policy in light of Brexit will indicate what kind of European identity it now aims to promote, and where we Anglo-Saxons and assorted Celts are expected to stand in relation to it.


(published as George W. Bush Was a Policy Pioneer)
Comment Central, 3rd February 2017

I wonder how many people will take this at face value...


Subtle Casualties: Conflict and Intangible Cultural Heritage
The Ethical War Blog, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace, 19th September 2016

Material heritage is not the only kind affected by war; how should our ethics take account of intangible heritage in conflict zones?

Why Should Cultural Artefacts Be More Rooted Than People?
The Conversation, 26th August 2016

Repatriation of cultural heritage is being debated at a time of mass migration—is heritage more important to countries that increasingly cannot be defined by their populations?

(published as Are You an E.U. Devotee?)
Comment Central

It wouldn’t be like this if we were leaving the World Trade Organisation...


(published as The Flagging Ideals of Multiculturalism)

Guest posts for Imagine Athena.


Exploring the Heavens and the Heritage of Mankind
In Commercial Space Exploration: Ethics, Policy and Governance (Ashgate, 2015), edited by Jai Galliott.

This is the last draft I approved; the printed version seems to have undergone some further copy-editing.

‘The heavens’ are among the oldest and most enduring heritage of human cultures: a scene of ancient myths and modern space opera. That something is part of somebody’s cultural heritage implies that there may be ethical duties to conserve it or otherwise treat it with respect, and space is no exception to this principle: recent work by Tony Milligan asserts that the cultural significances of the Moon may count against any prospect of lunar mining on a significantly destructive scale. Current literature on the ethics of cultural heritage, however, tends ordinarily to be suited to more familiar sorts of heritage: artefacts and places contested by terrestrial governments and settled ethnic groups, rather than the distant worlds above us. So long as space exploration is conducted by those same terrestrial governments and their agencies, current international agreements about protection of ‘the common heritage of mankind’ may seem adequate as a guiding light for their ethics in space. Private space exploration, however, introduces further difficulties.

Private individuals and corporations often have complex cultural affiliations of their own; and expansion into space may foster the development of identities not strongly grounded in the national and regional cultures of Earth. To look up and observe space is part of the heritage we share as human beings, whilst the names of the ‘heavenly bodies’ we perceive and the stories we tell about them are hallmarks of particular terrestrial cultures; but what responsibilities are borne towards this heritage by people who go out to explore and inhabit and exploit it? This essay considers in what ways, and to what extent, the roles which space has played within the cultures that have developed on Earth might place moral constraints upon private explorers of space. I argue that space qua heritage is best conceptualised as an intellectual resource: explorers will not find legendary heroes or crystal spheres, but it has been possible (for example) for human cultures to feature Moon Goddesses by virtue of the fact that there is a Moon. Drawing on ideas of stewardship which have been influential in archaeological ethics, I develop an account of how duties of conservation might put practical constraints upon the exploitation of this resource.

Fuelling the Insurgency? Antiquities in Iraq
Victvs, July/August 2014. (Victvs was then commissioning articles as a cultural intelligence and security consultancy, prior to its shift of emphasis onto counter-radicalisation training.)

Explaining the wider context of ISIS and the trade in illicit antiquities.

We Didn’t Start the Fire Either

This was drafted in response to a c.f.p. on youth representation and intergenerational justice, but for reasons I don’t fully remember I left it unfinished instead of writing the concluding section I intended; perhaps I suspected that what I wanted to say was diverging from the call’s remit.

Trouble With the Short Term
ORG Zine, October 2013

A feature examining the risk of short-term thinking in digital policy.


We have a moral vocabulary of democratic citizenship, and a moral vocabulary of environmental sustainability—but can our ethics encompass both in harmony?


Other Times and Other Peoples

Endorsed by the editor thusly: ‘This article is a total tease!’ A short piece for a general audience, raising questions about the extent to which we can compare cross-cultural encounters in different eras.

Blue Reread

A brief critical retrospective of William Gass’s On Being Blue.

Motherlands and Museum Pieces

This article briefly explains some of the moral and political problems occasioned by contested cultural heritage. A descriptive summary with lightly analytical commentary, intended for a non-specialist audience with an interest in cross-cultural relations.

Clutter, Memory, and Living Well

The rise of the professionalised organisation of living spaces has attracted remarkably little critical attention or reflection on its social and personal implications; yet if the therapeutic terms in which these services are routinely advertised are to be even half-believed, no comprehension of the good life can be quite complete until the domestic obstruction has been acknowledged as a candidate for exorcism. Beginning with these claims I consider the role of accumulated material possessions in the not-yet-wholly-flourishing life: specifically, I discuss the possibility that our stuff, as the residue of a personal past including our abandoned and unfinished projects, might be an obstruction to our wellbeing not merely by inconveniently taking up space in our homes, but as a medium through which dead pasts cling to our present selves. Considering two possible forms of memory (drawn from the work of Eli Zaretsky), I suggest that the implications of clutter’s presence and removal are no less mixed than our multiple ways of remembering, and that it is no simple question whether the life lived well is one which acknowledges or which smooths over the messiness of leading a human life in the modern world.

Getting ‘Virtual’ Wrongs Right

DOI: 10.1007/s10676-012-9304-z

The final text is archived here, minus the publisher’s layout and pagination.

Whilst some philosophical progress has been made on the ethical evaluation of playing video games, the exact subject matter of this enquiry remains surprisingly opaque. ‘Virtual murder’, simulation, representation and more are found in a literature yet to settle into a tested and cohesive terminology. Querying the language of the virtual in particular, I suggest that it is at once inexplicit and laden with presuppositions potentially liable to hinder anyone aiming to construct general philosophical claims about an ethics of gameplay, for whom assumptions about the existence of ‘virtual’ counterparts to morally salient phenomena may prove untrustworthy. Ambiguously straddling the pictorial and the performative aspects of video gaming, the virtual leaves obscure the ways in which we become involved in gameplay, and particularly the natures of our intentions and attitudes whilst grappling with a game; furthermore, it remains unclear how we are to generalise across encounters with the virtual. I conclude by briefly noting one potential avenue of further enquiry into our modes of participation in games: into the differences which a moral examination of playfulness might make to ethical evaluation.

The Ethical Patiency of Cultural Heritage
Doctoral thesis, Durham, 2011. This version corrects some minor textual errors which escaped both my and the examiners’ notice.

The thesis was supervised by Geoffrey Scarre, and examined in November 2011 by Peter Lamarque and Elisabeth Schellekens-Dammann.

[Erratum note: p. 30 conflates the Kumasi palace looting of 1874 with that of 1896.]

Current treatments of cultural heritage as an object of moral concern (whether it be the heritage of mankind or of some particular group of people) have tended to treat it as a means to ensure human wellbeing: either as ‘cultural property’ or ‘cultural patrimony’, suggesting concomitant rights of possession and exclusion, or otherwise as something which, gaining its ethical significance from the roles it plays in people’s lives and the formation of their identities, is the beneficiary at most of indirect moral obligations. In contrast, I argue that cultural heritage, as something whose existence can go well or badly, can itself qualify as a moral patient towards which we may have obligations which need not be accounted for in terms of subsequent benefits to human beings. Drawing inspiration from environmental ethics and suggesting that heritage, like an ecosystem, is a complex network of interrelations which invites a holistic understanding, I develop a framework for thinking about cultural heritage which shows how such a thing can feature in our ethical reflections as intrinsically worthy of respect in spite of its most obvious differences from the ‘natural’ world: the very human origins of cultural heritage and its involvement with human life in all its forms. As part of the development of this framework I consider the epistemic difficulties which arise when for all our holistic sophistication we do find ourselves in the predicament of having to judge the moral worth of some item of heritage, possibly someone else’s heritage and possibly something which we find ourselves disposed to value more because of than despite any mysteries surrounding it. I conclude by offering some tentative illustrations of how such a framework might operate in the practical course of normative moral reasoning about what should be done with items of cultural heritage.

Fernando Pessoa As Philosophers
From a February 2010 seminar.

Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) was a Portuguese literary figure and philosophical dabbler notable for being not only authorially multiple, as with Kierkegaard, but psychologically so: the ‘heteronyms’ under which he frequently wrote were, he declared in an unpublished draft, ‘lived by [him] within himself’. The close association between each heteronym’s pseudobiography, style, character and opinions doesn’t obviously sit neatly with any vision of philosophical writing as the presentation of impersonal deductive arguments; on the other hand, if we think philosophy should be life-changing and the philosopher ought to embody his philosophy then we’re also in difficulty, if we take that view to demand a psychological unity which Pessoa rejected. So I’d like to talk to you about how the case of Fernando Pessoa might offer some metaphilosophical insight into the interrelation between life and idea in philosophy.

From an August 2009 seminar: an attempt at self-exemplifying metaphilosophy. This was later to be cannibalised for parts when I needed to discuss the museum as applied moral epistemology as part of my work on heritage.

In this exploration I suggest that the visionary imagination can be understood as a specific mode of philosophical practice. If More’s Utopia and Bentham’s Panopticon qualify as philosophical writings, perhaps we could read the very environment around us as a massively collaboratively authored philosophical work; and, given this conjecture, it follows that an imaginative project which envisages possible environments can be read as a kind of speculative metaphilosophical reflection in dialogue with concrete practice. I present an interpretation of the visionary individual as someone imaginatively opening up possibilities for engaging philosophically with ideas embedded into the world.

Presented at the 2008 Durham-Bergen Conference, and would have been in Proceedings of the Eleventh Durham-Bergen Postgraduate Philosophy Seminar if the Proceedings backlog had ever been resolved.

To hint is to guide one’s audience to some thought while avoiding open endorsement of it: an uneasy ambivalence develops in a subterfuge which must fail, since the message has to be conveyed, but which nevertheless must succeed in preventing oneself’s being understood, for to be understood would be to be unmasked. This paper distinguishes hinting from other forms of indirect communication, and calls into question both the rationality and the moral permissibility of the practice.